FEP

Vol. 28, No. 1 Jaakko Pehkonen, Sampo Pehkonen and Matthias Strifler: Wage Effects of Firm Size: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Panel (pp. 1–9) Abstract This study explores the relationship between wages and firm size using large registered data and different identification strategies. We find

Vol. 27, No. 1 Milla Nyyssölä, Jukka Pirttilä and Susanna Sandström: Technology Adoption and Food Security in Subsistence Agriculture – Evidence from a Group-Based Aid Project in Mozambique (pp. 1–33) Abstract This paper evaluates the impact of an intervention to

Vol. 26, No. 2 Miikka Rokkanen and Roope Uusitalo: Changes in Job Stability – Evidence from Lifetime Job Histories (pp. 36–55) Abstract We use individual-level panel data spanning over 42 years from the pension records to evaluate changes in job

Vol. 26, No. 1 Martin Jacob and Jan Södersten: Mitigating Shareholder Taxation in Small Open Economies (pp. 1–12) Abstract This article reconsiders the role of dividend taxation and its effect on the cost of capital for small firms. Using a

Vol. 25, No.1 J.-P. Niinimäki: Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Prompt Corrective Action (pp. 1–19) Abstract The paper investigates the optimal design of bank bailouts in economies where banks can hide loan losses, and focuses on banking

Vol. 24, No. 2 John B. Taylor: The Rules-Discretion Cycle in Monetary and Fiscal Policy (pp. 78–86) Abstract This lecture starts with a review of historical trends in the balance between rules and discretion: first toward more discretionary policies in

Vol. 24, No. 1 Sari Pekkala Kerr and William R. Kerr: Economic Impacts of Immigration: A Survey (pp. 1–32) Abstract This paper surveys recent empirical studies on the economic impacts of immigration. The survey first examines the magnitude of immigration

Vol. 23, No. 1 Topi Miettinen: History-dependent Reciprocity in Alternating Offer Bargaining (pp. 1–15) Abstract This paper studies alternating-offer bargaining with players who have history-dependent reciprocity preferences. To allow for reciprocal motiva¬tion, the existing history-dependent models are modified by reversing