

## ONLINE SUPPLEMENT FOR THE POLITICAL OPINIONS OF SWEDISH SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

### *Appendix A. Analysis of Non-Response*

When working with survey data the question arises to what extent the received responses are representative of the population under study. In order to investigate this, we have conducted an analysis in two parts. In the first part we look at variables that are observed both in our sample and in the population to see how all invitees compare to the respondents in certain ways that can be expected to influence the responses. In the second part we look at variables that are only observed in our sample. Here we investigate whether answers given after the first or the second reminding e-mail are different from the answers that were given after the initial invitation. If differences appear, extrapolation methods can be used to correct for non-response bias (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). The first part, where we investigate observed variables, is in turn divided into four steps.

*Firstly*, we have compared each college's or university's share of invitations with its share of responses. With three exceptions, the share of responses from each college or university lies within one percentage point of the share of invitations to the same college or university, and the three exceptions (Göteborg University, Stockholm University, and Umeå University) deviate in the 1.6–2.5 percentage-unit range.

*Secondly*, we have compared the gender distribution. 63.2 percent of the invitations were sent to men and 36.8 percent to women. This is very close to the gender pattern among responses: 62.5 percent men and 36.6 percent women (0.9 percent abstained from reporting their gender). For all seats of learning with at least 40 responses, the difference between the share of female respondents and the share of invitations to women lies within 5 percentage points.

*Thirdly*, we have looked at the distribution of academic positions. As can be seen in Table A1, there are very small differences between the share of invitations and the share of responses for the three categories of social scientists.

Table A1. Positions among invitees and respondents.

Position	No. of invitations	Share of invitations (percent)	No. of responses	Share of responses (percent)
Doctoral student	1,621	37.7	589	39.0
Researcher, lecturer	2,162	50.3	761	50.3
Professor	447	10.4	161	10.6
Not classified	71	1.6	1	0.0

Notes: The group "Researcher, lecturer" consists of the following positions: teacher, postdoctoral fellow, researcher, and lecturer.

*Fourthly*, we have compared the distribution of disciplinary belonging. The results are presented in Table A2. The largest deviation is for business administration, 3.9 percentage points, but in general the shares of responses deviate very little from the shares of invitations.

Table A2. Disciplines among invitees and respondents.

Subject	No. of invitations	Share of invitations (percent)	No. of responses	Share of responses (percent)
Economic history	225	5.2	64	4.3
Business administration	1,446	33.6	449	29.7
Gender studies	123	2.9	39	2.6
Law	506	11.8	146	9.7
Economics	790	18.4	276	18.3
Sociology	570	13.3	237	15.7
Political science	497	11.6	204	13.5
Other subject/not classified	144	3.3	97	6.4
Total	4,301	100	1,512	100

In conclusion, we think that the first part of the analysis supports the belief that the respondents in central dimensions are representative of the population.

In the second part of the analysis we turn to the variables under study that are not observed in the population: bloc preferences, policy views, self-reported left–right scale, and “influential activities”. Although our respondents appear to mirror the population in important observable dimensions there is always the risk that the answers that we focus on – and that are not observed in the population – give an unrepresentative picture of political opinions. By assuming that responses given after the first or the second reminder are similar to the responses that were never received, we can investigate whether late and early responses differ systematically. If such differences are at hand, it is unlikely that the survey participants are representative of the population of Swedish social scientists in the seven disciplines.

Table A3. Bloc sympathies of Swedish social scientists (percent).

	No. responses	Left bloc	Right bloc	Ratio left bloc/ right bloc
Responses after the initial invitation (and before the first reminder)	1,024	32.9	42.3	0.8
Responses after the first (and before the second) reminder	260	32.7	37.7	0.9
Responses after the second reminder	228	35.1	43.4	0.8

Notes: The table is based on responses to the question “Even though one doesn’t agree with a political party on each and every issue, one may have stronger sympathies for a certain party, compared to others. Which party do you have the strongest sympathies for?” The left bloc comprises the Social Democratic Party (S), the Left Party (V), and the Green Party (Mp). The right bloc comprises the Christian Democrats (Kd), the Moderate Party (M), the Center Party (C), and the Liberal Party (Fp).

Based on Table A3, a two sample test of proportions fails to reject ( $p > 0.1$ ) that the proportion of right bloc sympathies in responses received after the initial invitation is different from this proportion in responses received after the first and the second reminder respectively. In doing this test we exclude the reply alternatives “None”, “Do not know / Do not want to answer”, and “Other” (here including the June List and the Feminist Initiative). Table A4 reports mean responses to the policy questions. As can be seen, they (as well as the standard deviations) are very similar for the three groups, and a Mann–Whitney test across two independent samples fails to reject equality of the distributions at the ten percent level.

Table A4. Views on economic policy (means with standard deviations in parentheses).

	Responses after the initial invitation (and before the first reminder)	Responses after the first (and before the second) reminder	Responses after the second reminder
Raise tariffs	1.56 (0.72)	1.52 (0.67)	1.56 (0.74)
Abolish union boycotts	2.71 (1.42)	2.63 (1.42)	2.68 (1.42)
Undertake tax cuts	3.21 (1.29)	3.26 (1.26)	3.27 (1.35)
Downsize public sector	2.90 (1.30)	2.83 (1.28)	2.91 (1.31)
Reduce income differences	3.46 (1.23)	3.50 (1.17)	3.50 (1.19)

Table A5. Left–right positioning (means with standard deviations in parentheses).

	No. responses	Left–right position
Responses after the initial invitation (and before the first reminder)	975	5.37 (2.29)
Responses after the first (and before the second) reminder	239	5.22 (2.29)
Responses after the second reminder	216	5.42 (2.42)

Based on Table A5, according to the Mann–Whitney test, the distributions of left–right positions in the first group of responses are not different from the distributions in the second and third group respectively.

Table A6. Influential activities (percent).

Activity	Level of participation	Responses after the initial invitation (and before the first reminder)	Responses after the first (and before the second) reminder	Responses after the second reminder
Government commissions	No participation	72.46	68.08	64.47
	Low level of participation	13.57	13.46	16.23
	High level of participation	11.13	16.54	17.54
Radio and television	No participation	56.15	51.54	50.44
	Low level of participation	25.10	25.00	25.44
	High level of participation	18.46	22.31	24.12
Teaching material and popular science	No participation	29.39	25.38	27.19
	Low level of participation	48.14	46.54	43.42
	High level of participation	21.39	26.54	27.63

Notes: For government commissions a low (high) level of participation is defined as once (several times). For radio and television a low (high) level of participation is defined as between one and three times (more than three times). For teaching material and popular science a low (high) level of participation is defined as between one and five articles and books (more than five articles and books).

Only in one case in Table A6 does the Mann–Whitney test indicate a difference in the distribution of responses. This is the case for participation in government commissions where the responses after the second (but not after the first) reminder differ significantly from the responses after the initial invitation.

*Appendix B*

Table B1. Response rates for each university and in total.

Seat of learning	Invitations	Responses	Response rate (percent)
Stockholm University	625	196	31.4
Lund University	535	173	32.3
Uppsala University	533	179	33.6
Gothenburg University	524	147	28.1
Stockholm School of Economics	336	122	36.3
Umeå University	295	131	44.4
Örebro University	140	58	41.4
Växjö University	138	53	38.4
Linköping University	121	45	37.2
Södertörn University College	118	35	29.7
Karlstad University	108	47	43.5
Jönköping International Business School	94	33	35.1
Luleå University of Technology	89	35	38.9
Mälardalen University College	89	26	29.2
Gävle University College	82	27	32.9
Royal Institute of Technology	80	21	26.3
Chalmers University of Technology	75	29	38.7
Mid-Sweden University	70	27	38.6
Swedish University of Agricultural Science	56	17	30.4
Kalmar University College	51	20	39.2
Dalarna University College	43	18	41.9
West University College (Trollhättan/Uddevalla)	36	18	50.0
Kristianstad University College	34	14	41.2
Malmö University College	21	8	38.1
Gotland University College	8	4	50.0
“At the moment I am not active at any university/university college”	0	29	
Total	4,301	1,512	35.2

Box B1. The Swedish political parties in brief.

*The Center Party* is a centrist party with agrarian and rural roots. It opposes nuclear power, although less rigidly so nowadays, and is in favor of decentralized political structure in Sweden and Europe. On economic issues, it advocates deregulation of the labor market.

*The Christian Democrats* is a christian democratic party with roots in the evangelical free churches. It argues for a grant to parents who stay at home with their children, for increased expenditures on care for the elderly, for a reduction in property taxation and against expanded rights for gays.

*The Feminist Initiative* is a new party focusing on feminist issues. On economic issues, it largely advocates a leftist policy, with high taxes and generous welfare programs. It did not get into Parliament in the 2006 election.

*The Green Party* is in favor of regulation and taxation to stimulate behavior that it deems beneficial for the environment. It wants to increase the gasoline tax and the cost of polluting. Compared with other green parties in Europe it has been sceptical towards the European Union. It supported the previous social democratic government.

*The June List* was founded as a party for the European Parliament but decided to run in the Swedish parliamentary election in 2006. It wants Sweden to disassociate from the European Union and to increase regional and local autonomy. It did not get into Parliament.

*The Left Party* is a former communist party that advocates increased taxation, especially on the wealthy and on high-income earners, and increased public expenditure, e.g. a large increase in the number of employees in the public sector. It also stresses feminist issues. It opposes Swedish membership in the European Union. It supported the previous social democratic government.

*The Liberal Party* is a social liberal party with roots in the temperance movement, some free churches and in an educated, big-city middle class stressing political rights, equality and a relatively ambitious welfare state. It stresses the importance of law and order and advocates a language test for new citizens.

*The Moderate Party* is a broad center-right party with a mixed conservative and market liberal program. It advocates tax cuts for income earners and businesses who employ new staff, while at the same time advocating reduced unemployment benefits.

*The Social Democratic Party* is the main party on the left, with a traditional pro-labor profile, lately expanded to include the middle class. It is a staunch defender of the welfare state, with high taxes and high welfare benefits, as well as a regulated labor market.

*Appendix C*

Table C1. Party sympathies among Swedish social scientists per discipline (percent).

	Business administration	Economics	Economic history	Gender studies	Law	Political science	Sociology
Christian Democrats	4.5	3.3	0	0	2.1	0.5	0.4
Moderate Party	21.4	20.4	6.3	0	19.2	7.4	1.7
Center Party	3.6	1.8	1.6	2.6	2.1	2.5	1.3
Liberal Party	31.4	27.2	23.4	7.7	23.3	19.1	7.6
Social Democrats	10.9	18.1	20.3	7.7	13.0	25.5	21.9
Left Party	2.2	2.9	12.5	7.7	5.5	7.4	23.6
Green Party	6.7	5.8	7.8	7.7	6.2	12.3	11.8
Feminist Initiative	1.6	0.4	4.7	33.3	4.1	4.4	7.6
June List	0.9	2.9	3.1	0	2.1	0.5	1.3
Other	0.9	0.4	1.6	2.6	0	0	0.8
None	6.0	8.3	10.9	18.0	13.7	11.3	12.2
Don't know / Don't want to answer	10.0	8.7	7.8	12.8	8.9	9.3	9.7




Figure C1. Left–right positioning for all respondents.

### *Appendix D. Logit regression*

In Table D1, we present logit–regression results for bloc preferences. Our motivation for choosing the control variables is the following.

a) *Age*. Age categories may capture ideological differences between cohorts: political preferences are generally thought to be formed in early years, before the age of 25–30, and if, say, social scientists were of that age in the left–ideological late 1960s, their political opinions can be expected to differ from those of younger colleagues, who were influenced by different political climates. More generally, age may be related to different preferences as a person moves through the life cycle. References in support: Campbell et al. (1960), Sears (1983), Smith (2005), Strömberg (2006), and Goerres (2008).

b) *Gender*. It is clearly established in the literature that there are differences in political opinions between women and men – there is a so–called political gender gap. Hence, it seems important to control for gender. References in support: Edlund and Pande (2002), Eagly et al. (2004), and Bergh (2007).

c) *Income*. It is commonplace to regard political opinions as related to socioeconomic status, of which income is an indicator. Many of the political issues, such as taxation, directly relate to income. That voters tend to respond to political proposals on the basis of their effects of income has also been established. References in support: Markus (1988, 1992), Nadeau and Lewis–Beck (2001), Oskarson (2005), and Elinder et al. (2008).

d) *Position in the academy*. Position in the academy is related to job security, which can be related to political opinions, and it is also related to the level of expertise. Even without any expectation of an effect here, we would find it interesting to see whether there are differences with regard to position. (And we did find indications of a difference.) Reference in support: Caplan (2007).

e) *University affiliation*. There are, on the one hand, regional differences in political opinions in Sweden, and controlling for university affiliation is a way to control for such differences. On the other hand, these variables primarily constitute a way to control for research quality, assuming that most of the highest–ranked scholars in each discipline are found at the oldest and largest universities, whereas many of the lowest–ranked scholars are found at the new and small university colleges.

Table D1. Bloc preference (1 equals the right bloc, 0 equals the left bloc).

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Discipline where active</i>			
Business administration	1.309** (4.86)	1.270** (4.61)	1.374** (4.76)
Economic history	–0.044 (0.11)	–0.110 (0.28)	0.028 (0.07)
Economics	0.806** (2.88)	0.785** (2.76)	0.930** (3.09)
Gender studies	–0.551 (0.84)	–0.507 (0.76)	–0.338 (0.50)
Law	0.770* (2.43)	0.798* (2.46)	0.951** (2.77)
Political science	–0.253 (0.87)	–0.253 (0.86)	–0.101 (0.32)
Sociology	–1.511** (4.72)	–1.477** (4.55)	–1.359** (3.97)

<i>Age</i>				
	Age<30	0.113 (0.49)	0.124 (0.52)	0.158 (0.64)
	Age 31–50	0.440* (2.06)	0.382 (1.74)	0.403 (1.80)
<i>Gender</i>				
	Woman	-0.200 (1.34)	-0.264 (1.70)	-0.259 (1.64)
<i>Position</i>				
	Graduate student	0.396 (1.87)	0.542* (2.40)	0.610** (2.61)
	Junior lecturer	0.161 (0.59)	0.222 (0.79)	0.329 (1.07)
	Lecturer	0.296 (1.32)	0.185 (0.80)	0.284 (1.16)
	Professor	0.765** (2.60)	0.367 (1.13)	0.407 (1.22)
<i>Monthly family income</i>				
	0–20,000 SEK		-1.026** (2.95)	-0.977** (2.75)
	20–30,000 SEK		-0.847** (2.90)	-0.820** (2.75)
	30–40,000 SEK		-0.883** (3.26)	-0.843** (3.03)
	40–50,000 SEK		-0.715** (2.70)	-0.654* (2.42)
	50–60,000 SEK		-0.313 (1.18)	-0.326 (1.21)
	60–70,000 SEK		-0.734** (2.70)	-0.727** (2.64)
<i>Academic affiliation</i>				
	Gothenburg University			-0.242 (0.85)
	Karlstad University			0.096 (0.22)
	Linköping University			-0.403 (0.89)
	Luleå University of Technology			0.820 (1.55)
	Lund University			0.140 (0.49)
	Mid-Sweden University			1.311* (2.26)
	Örebro University			-0.068 (0.17)
	Royal Institute of Technology			0.439 (0.62)

Stockholm School of Economics			0.185 (0.54)
Stockholm University			-0.004 (0.01)
Swedish University of Agricultural Science			-0.317 (0.54)
Umeå University			-0.354 (1.19)
Uppsala University			-0.100 (0.36)
Växjö University			-0.687 (1.67)
Not primarily active at an academic institution			0.787 (1.50)
Constant	-0.688 (1.95)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.221 (0.49)
Observations	1,124	1,104	1,104
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.14	0.15	0.17

Notes: Reference discipline: Active in other discipline. Reference age: >50. Reference gender: Man or not disclosed. Reference position: Researcher, research fellow. Reference monthly income: 70,000 SEK and above. Reference academic affiliation: University colleges. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%. Pearson or Hosmer–Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test yields a Pearson chi-square of 929.23 (p=0.04).

Table D2. The model's ability to classify bloc preferences correctly.

	Truly right bloc	Truly left bloc	Total
Classified as right bloc	505	206	711
Classified as left bloc	110	283	393
Total	615	489	

Notes: Classified as right bloc if predicted  $\Pr(\text{Truly right bloc}) \geq 0.5$ . Correctly classified: 71.4 percent.

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